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The term ‘space’, as it appears in the title of this study, was not current in the Middle 
Ages. The notion of space familiar to us, from ordinary perception or philosophical 
analysis, as an undifferentiated and homogenous receptacle, was alien to the medieval 
mind.1 The term as such was found only rarely, and then generally meaning an interval or 
the distance between two determinate points or places, lacking any reality of itself.2 
Space thus obtains between two and ‘is made to exist only by sprinkling places in it’.3
 The conditions of place were altogether different. As the object of immediate 
perception and theoretical reflection, ‘place’ was concomitant to every individual 
existence and, together with time, determined it hic et nunc. Place was omnipresent and 
multiplied in a multitude of local determinations: that – uncountable – of every individual 
capable of movement; that of every object capable of locomotion; that of every reality 
with a fixed location; that of planets, stars, the world, paradise, purgatory, or hell… 
 The differentiation of places – some of which were charged with strong emotional 
or religious value – responded not only to the multiplication of physical objects, all 
necessarily determined locally. It also resulted from the differentiation of subjects, 
formulated in terms either of ontological categories (human beings, angels, God), or of 
moral qualities within one and the same category – those qualities in their turn producing 
different situations or locations in the realms beyond (hell, purgatory, paradise). 
 The differentiation of subjects into distinct ontological categories is what grounds 
the very possibility of the question of the location of separate substances. Since place is 
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not a homogenous space containing different things but a specific categorical 
determination denoting the situation of each and every object, each reality has its own 
place. Thus, given that separate substances constitute a distinct ontological category, any 
attempt to assess their status calls for an examination of the question of their location.4
 But before determining what this place is, medieval thinkers inquired about the 
very possibility of location of spiritual substances: ‘Utrum angelus sit in loco’. This is the 
question that will occupy the following pages. More precisely, I shall examine the 
discussion of this problem in John Duns Scotus, taking into account Scotus’s 
predecessors in an attempt to assess his contribution both to angelology and to the 
physics of place. 
 
1. Before Scotus 
Scotus’s discussion of angelic location follows the same approach of previous 
commentators of Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Distancing himself from Augustine5 and 
Boethius6, who denied local presence to spiritual creatures, the Lombard distinguished 
between two modes of location: ‘circumscriptive’, which holds for corporeal substances - 
for bodies are physically situated in a place three-dimensionally; and ‘definitive’, which 
obtains in spiritual creatures - for non-corporeal creatures are related to a determinate 
place (and not to all places) without being physically circumscribed in it.7 The 
Lombard’s distinction was in all likelihood aimed at avoiding the unpalatable thesis that 
spiritual creatures are ubiquitous. Subsequent commentators will follow the Lombard’s 
position on this issue, if granting that separate substances are located at least definitive. 
 This distinction, however, did not avoid all difficulties. The way in which 
‘definitive’ location was to be understood remained an open question, and it is on this 
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point that the differences in opinion began to emerge. There were two alternative lines of 
thought: (1) according to the first, the relation of an angel to its physical place results 
solely from the angel’s mental operations; (2) the second holds rather that the relation to 
their place inheres in the very substance of spiritual creatures.8 Before examining 
Scotus’s position, it would be helpful to identify some representatives of one and the 
other lines of thought, in order to provide the main points of reference and context for the 
Scotist discussion. 
 
1.1. Location of angels by their operation 
Thomas Aquinas explicitly supports this thesis in various writings: I Sent., d. 37 q. 3 a. 1-
3; Quodlibet I, q. 3 a. 1; Summa Theol. I, q. 52 a. 1-3. Aquinas’s adherence to the 
Aristotelian definition of place as ‘the innermost motionless boundary of the container’,9 
as well as his conception of the status of angels as radically immaterial substances, led 
him to reject the thesis that angels are located by virtue of their being, in favour of the 
idea that an angel’s relation to a physical place results from its operations of intellect and 
will. These operations produce a – virtual – contact through the application of the angel’s 
virtus to a specific place, in relation to which the angel is then said to be located.10 An 
angel is therefore located not by its presence in a place, but by a relation to the place 
which remains external, because it is brought about solely by the application of the 
angel’s virtus. We are thus confronted with a notion of location disengaged from 
circumscription and reduced to a relation with space that does not denote dependence. 
When it comes to spiritual substances Aquinas inverts the terms of the standard relation 
between the containing place and the contained object, redefining it in terms of 
containing subject and contained place: the angel virtually contains the place to which it 
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is related, because its status determines a relation to that place which depends on the 
angel’s mental operations alone.11 Although all kind of circumscription or 
commensurability to the place is excluded, the angel remains nonetheless locally 
determined. Its local determination does not however appear to be a permanent quality, 
since it results from the angel’s free operations of intellect and will. It is therefore a very 
restricted sense of location, limited to the effective application of the angel’s virtus to a 
given physical place.12 Therefore, except for those who oversee celestial movement,13 
angels are not always located. Their freedom to relate to a place grants them control of 
the spatial dimension.14 The Thomist position, heavily dependent on the privileged status 
attributed to separate substances, thus represents a ‘minimalist’ understanding of angels’ 
local determination – an understanding which assumes only the strictly necessary in order 
to avoid the thesis of the ubiquity of spiritual creatures. In brief, Aquinas admits that an 
angel is related to a place ‘definitive, quia ita est in uno loco, quod non in alio’15, even if 
the meaning denoted by ‘definitive’ appears rather weak. 
 This difficulty did not escape Giles of Rome. He shared the Thomist view in 
general lines, but sharpened it by introducing the adverb ‘always’, and by acknowledging 
the impossibility of specifying the exact meaning of the angel’s ‘applicatio virtutis’ to a 
place. After rejecting two alternative positions as unacceptable,16 Giles introduces his 
opinion in close connection to that of Aquinas. He presents the latter as holding that 
‘angelus est in loco per operationem’, adding however that ‘angeli aliquando non 
operantur circa corpora, ideo aliquando non sunt in loco per operationem’.17 At the 
same time, Giles takes issue with the Thomist position: ‘Primum est bene dictum, sed 
secundum non credo’.18 He thus shares the thesis of location according to operation, but 
denies the possibility of an angel’s non-location.19
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 Like Aquinas, Giles understands location according to operation as the result of 
the action whereby the angel applies its virtual quantity to a body.20 But Giles corrects 
Aquinas’s view saying that ‘angelus semper operatur circa locum et sic semper est in 
loco’.21 The double ‘semper’ rests on the idea of universal order, according to which the 
spiritual commands the corporeal and relates to it by virtual contact. That contact is 
constant, since separate substances are constantly exercising their influence on the 
corporeal world. Giles concludes on these grounds that angels are always located.22 In 
this way, he removes the ambiguity in Aquinas’s position by making of location a 
permanent determination belonging to separate substances: ‘[angelus] semper aliquo 
modo circa aliqua corpora operatur: propter quod numquam contigit ipsum nusquam 
esse’.23
The permanent application of the angel’s virtus to a body does not always imply 
movement. An angel can also be located in relation to the empyrean, which is motionless. 
Therefore, Giles concludes, it must be granted that we cannot explain all forms of 
location, even if we must admit that angels are always located.24
 Giles’s argument in Quaestiones de motu angelorum (1288-89), composed some 
sixteen years later, follows the same vein. Giles preserves his position, albeit varying the 
vocabulary somewhat. The opposition between quantitas dimensiva and quantitas 
virtualis is replaced by that of extensio and applicatio, but with the same purpose of 
defending the thesis that bodies are located according to their extension, while separate 
substances are located according to their virtus.25 Overall, Giles adheres to the Thomist 
thesis, but perfects it by adding some cogency to notion of angelic location. He is 
however unable to give further clarification on the status of the operations that bring 
about the permanent relation between separate substances and space. 
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1.2. Location of angels ‘per se’ 
The thesis of location of angels ‘per se’ predominates after 1277. As we know, Tempier’s 
syllabus condemned the idea that angels are not in a place, together the theses that they 
are located solely according to their operation, and that their substance constitutes the 
ultimate foundation of their location.26 The ambiguous, not to say problematic, character 
of these three articles – already pointed out by Henry of Ghent, a member of the 
commission –27 neither compromised nor hampered their normative value for a good 
number of authors who, starting with William of la Mare,28 rejected the thesis that angels 
are located according their operation. I shall consider the account of three such authors. 
 The first is Peter John Olivi, who discussed the problem of angelic location 
extensively in question 32 of his commentary on book II of the Sentences, composed in 
the years 1278-79. The purpose of his examination is to determine the (true) status of 
separate substances against the philosophical tradition which had erroneously attributed 
them a quasi-divine nature.29 The question of location thus occupies a strategic place in 
Olivi’s angelology.30 The thesis of the location of angels ‘per se’ is proved by a threefold, 
rather elaborate argument. Essentially, it holds that there is an order or relation which 
intrinsically determines all spiritual creatures.31 Olivi advances three kinds of relation 
which serve to found angelic location: (1) a relation of ‘assistentia’, which can be 
understood as co-existence or co-presence. The actual existence of two realities 
necessarily implies that they are related to each other, either immediately or in a mediated 
way. This is the equally case for spiritual as for a bodily substances: their coexistence 
implies the presence of one to the other – in the case of the spirit, it consists in its 
immediate or mediated presence to the physical place of the body. This relation of mutual 
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presence determines the being of the created realities and ultimately explains their 
location. (2) The second type of relation is based on action. All action performed with 
respect to an object implies that the subject must be first intentionally directed towards it. 
But this intentionality already implies a presence. Therefore, angelic action implies that 
the angel is present to its object and its place and is, for the same reason, located. (3) The 
third type of relation results from the capacity to move. Indeed, the angel’s freedom to 
move to different places implies an orientation towards the term of the movement and, on 
the same grounds, a presence that explains the angel’s location. 
 According to Olivi, this threefold relation intrinsically determines spiritual 
creatures and explains their location as being ‘per se’ and not merely according to 
operation. This tenet is underpinned by the hypothesis of the possible suppression of 
material bodies: even in the absence of all physical reality angels would be located, 
because their location consists primarily in a relational mode of being which intrinsically 
determines all creatures.32 The necessary relation of the angel to space is thus presented 
as an essential mark of its finiteness and createdness.33
 At this point it would be useful to recall a second opinion, that of Olivi’s 
contemporary Matthew of Aquasparta, who develops his position in the Quaestiones 
disputatae de anima separata, between 1277 and 1279. Matthew treats the question of 
angelic location together with that of separate souls, a connection which is clearly 
illustrated by the use of the generic term ‘substantiae spirituales’ to denote both ‘anima 
separata’ and ‘angelus’. Explicitly referring to the condemnations of 1241 and 1277, 
Matthew unequivocally rejects the thesis that spiritual substances are located by their 
operation,34 on the grounds that spatial determination is inherent to created being 
(creatures ‘sunt per se in loco’). He explains his position on the basis of four reasons: 
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 (1) The first one derives from the order of the universe: as creatures, spiritual 
substances form part of the universe and the celestial sphere which encloses the world.35 
Since the order of the universe assigns a place to each creature and determines its 
situation in relation to other things, spiritual substances are necessarily located. (2) The 
second reason rests on the finiteness of spiritual substances: as creatures, they are 
intrinsically finite in their essence and in their faculties. This limitation also implies an 
ubi, since they do not enjoy the privilege of ubiquity.36 (3) Divine providence supplies 
the third reason for angelic location. God has assigned angels a place in the empyrean as 
the location most suitable to their nature.37 (4) The fourth and last reason derives from 
divine justice, which assigns each being a place according to their merit. As creatures, it 
thus pertains to spiritual substances to be situated according to their moral condition (of 
beatitude or damnation), and consequently to be located according to essence.38
 Matthew is nevertheless aware that the thesis that spiritual substances are located 
in a physical place is problematic on account of their simplicity and indivisibility. Eager 
to clarify this point, he adds that their location does not imply dependence on the place or 
circumscription in the sense of commensurability (‘nec per circumscriptionem sive 
commensurationem’), but rather ‘quandam suae [sc. angeli] praesentiae 
communicationem vel suae substantiae praesentationem et existentiae praesentialis 
definitionem’.39 Separate substances are thus necessarily present in certain places 
according to the limitations assigned by God to their nature.40 As with Olivi, the net of 
structural relations which forms the universal order confers to each and every member of 
the cosmos its local determination. Comprised within this net, angels do not escape 
location, even if they relate to their place without commensurability. Location by essence 
appears here again as a mark of finiteness: being locally determined means, strictly 
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speaking, ‘not being able to be everywhere’. 
 This point is reinforced by Matthew’s justification of the 1277 condemnation, 
specifically the latter’s rejection of the thesis that angels are located according to their 
operation, and the denial that it is their essence or substance that explains their location.41 
Underlying Matthew’s justification of the condemnation is his distinction between 
application to a place and delimitation within a place. Application to a determinate place 
is explained by the order of the universe (first and third reasons above), while the 
delimitation within a place is explained by the finiteness which characterizes all 
creatures.42 Matthew thus accounts for the location of angels by resorting to the relational 
structure of the universe and to created finiteness. He fails however to clarify the nature 
of this finiteness which does not seem to derive from the essence of creatures.43 
Universal order on the one hand and createdness on the other – i.e. relation to other 
created beings and relation to God: this twofold relation determines and spatializes 
spiritual creatures without making them dependent on a physical place. For it is their 
dependence on God that ultimately grounds the angel’s local delimitation. Local 
determination is thus articulated in terms of the limitation intrinsic to creatures: ‘eo quod 
limitatae sunt, sunt in potentia ad “ubi”’.44
 A third proponent of the location ‘per se’ of angels is Richard of Mediavilla, who 
treats the question in his commentary on the Sentences (1285).45 Before developing his 
own position, Richard brings to the fore the condemnation of 1277.46 Like Olivi, he 
distinguishes between the ‘applicatio virtutis’ and ‘operation’ strictly speaking: the first 
requires the previous presence of the angel to its object, such that before any operation 
the angel is already located by being present to its object.47 Richard explains this location 
‘per se’ in terms of Aristotelian causality: the efficient cause of the ‘applicatio virtutis’ is 
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the angel’s will and its effective capacity, as well as (indirectly) the divine will as 
superior efficient cause; the final cause of angelic location lies in the unity, order, and 
connection of the universe; finally, the final cause resides neither in being circumscribed 
in a place – since the angel has no dimensions – nor in the angels’s operations nor in the 
order of the universe,48 but in the relation of simultaneity between the angel and its place 
or the physical realities existing in that place.49 Note that this thesis reintroduces Olivi’s 
idea of the coexistence of the angel with beings of the world – an idea found as well in 
Matthew in Aquasparta and his conception of ‘presentialitas’ and ‘communicatio 
praesentiae’. 
 The ambiguity of the condemned articles thus incites Richard to develop an 
articulate explanation which results in the identification of three foundations for angelic 
location, the primary one being neither the angel’s operation nor its essence but its 
coexistence with other realities of the world. It is a factual argument, for it derives from 
the consideration of the order of things as it manifests itself hic et nunc. In this vein, to 
the objection that denies angelic location (by their presence to a body) in virtue of God’s 
power to suppress the corporeal world, Richard responds that the problem does not 
consist in knowing what God can or cannot do, but in determining what has already been 
done: ‘quod factum est’.50
  
2. Duns Scotus and the place of angels 
In his commentary on book II of the Sentences, Scotus devotes four questions to the issue 
of angelic location, before he draws the consequences for the concept of motion.51 
Predictably, he presents the thesis of angelic location according to operation in 
connection to Tempier’s condemnation – a condemnation to which he attributes universal 
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validity, in contrast to Godfrey of Fontaines, who had strongly relativized it.52 Scotus 
then recalls the positions of Godfrey of Fontaines and Giles of Rome,53 as he criticizes 
them for being merely disguised versions of Aquinas’s inconsistencies.54
 Scotus recapitulates several objections against the Thomist thesis of location 
according to operation. Among them we recognize an argument first found in Olivi and 
reintroduced by Richard of Mediavilla – that of the necessary presence of the angel to its 
object before acting upon it – one put forward by Giles of Rome against the Thomist 
position – namely, the consequences of the non-location of angels -55 and the condition 
advanced by Richard of Mediavilla on the formal character of the location of spiritual 
creatures.56 Despite their value, these objections are deemed insufficient by Scotus, who 
then spends some time developing his own position. 
 
2.1. The location of bodies 
The first stage is occupied with specifying the conditions of bodily location.57 Following 
the lead  of Aristotle, Scotus enumerates five: (1) being in an actual place, (2) being in a 
determined place because equal (to the body), (3) being in a place commensurably, (4) 
being in this determinate place at the exclusion of others, (5) being in a place in a natural 
or in a violent way.58 The first four conditions pertain to a body as quantum, that is, 
insofar as it is endowed with mathematical dimensions, independently of the particular 
characteristics that qualify its nature. The body as quantum is in fact logically prior to any 
quality which could affect it, because quantity is presupposed by quality, even if in reality 
no corporeal quantity exists without qualities. Significantly, Scotus links this discussion 
with the Aristotelian hypothesis of the void. If we place a cubic body without natural 
qualities in the air or in water, the body will produce a void of the same dimensions. This 
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‘production of a void’ results exclusively from the body as quantum - that is, as 
possessing mathematical dimensions.59
 Scotus’s interpretation of the Aristotelian hypothesis finds resonance in his theory 
of place as primarily signifying a quantity and a figure, rather than a quality and a nature. 
For Scotus place appears to be a pure form, ‘a mathematical property’ before becoming a 
physical property.60 All bodies are located insofar as they are mathematical quanta. Only 
the fifth condition – being in a place naturally or violently – is fulfilled in terms of a 
natural quality.61 Thus, despite the initial endorsement of the Aristotelian conditions of 
location, Scotus seems to distance himself from this teaching as he strongly relativizes 
the physical and natural dimension of place, tending rather towards a mathematization or 
geometrization of space.62
 Scotus’s distanciation from the Aristotelian theory is equally manifest in his thesis 
of the immobility of place, a thesis which in Aristotle clashed starkly with the notion of 
the contiguity of a place with the contained body (place being defined here as ‘the 
innermost motionless boundary of the container’).63 The question thus becomes how to 
safeguard the immobility of the place at the moment when, as container, it becomes 
mobile? In his response, Scotus shows awareness of other solutions to this problem 
advanced by previous authors.64 He alludes mainly to Aquinas, who had solved the 
question by conceiving every containing mobile place as part of the whole universal 
place, the latter being motionless on account of the fixedness of its centre and its poles. In 
other words, even if each particular place is mobile, its necessary relation to the whole 
universal place guarantees its immobility. Aquinas thus advances the distinction – later 
sharpened by Giles of Rome – between material place (the mobile container) and formal 
place (the relation of the mobile container to the motionless whole).65 The Thomist 
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solution to the difficulty inherent in the Aristotelian thesis undoubtedly constituted a step 
forward, but remained nevertheless profoundly akin to the spirit of that thesis, especially 
in what regards the physical and natural status of a place – for Aquinas interpreted the 
contiguity of the containing place and of the contained body as a proximity of nature – 
and in the cosmological basis of the Aristotelian theory – for the immobility of a place 
was guaranteed by the fixed coordinates of the finite and motionless universe.66
 Scotus finds the Thomist solution unconvincing67 and instead propounds a thesis 
on the immobility of place which distances itself markedly from the Aristotelian position. 
For Scotus it is evident that if a subject changes, its accidents change too. As the accident 
of a containing movable body, place cannot remain under any circumstance numerically 
the same – i.e. permanent and motionless. Likewise, it is of no avail to attempt to fix it by 
attaching it to an absolute and motionless place, for, insofar as it is merely a part of such 
a place and the accident of a movable subject, it will always remain movable. Its 
immobility must therefore be guaranteed by means other than the relation to another, 
supposedly motionless, place. That other means consists in conceiving the immobility of 
a place ‘in opposition to local movement’ and its incorruptibility ‘according to a relation 
of equivalence to local movement’.68
 What does this mean? Put more simply, place is motionless by itself and by 
accident when considered at a specific instant. Thus, if a containing body moves, it is that 
body and not the place that is movable, because at the very instant when the containing 
body moves, its place, as an accident, also moves and is no longer the same. It is then the 
case not of the same movable place, but of another place which is – instantly – 
motionless. Furthermore, that same place is ‘incorruptible by equivalence’, for even if the 
place is destroyed by the movement of its subject, the place’s foundation remains the 
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same throughout the succession of places by virtue of a relation of equivalence to local 
movement. In other words, even if different places are numerically distinct from each 
other, they are incorruptible insofar as they all hold the same relation to local succession. 
These relations of equivalence allow us to consider all places as denoting one and the 
same relation, which in its turn guarantees the incorruptibility of each place.69
 In elaborating his position, Scotus advances the example of the successive 
utterance of one and the same word. Each utterance of the word is numerically distinct 
and successive in time. But considered in relation to its end – i.e. to signify a concept – 
each utterance pertains to the same word and holds a relation of equivalence with the 
desired end. This relation allows us to conceive the different utterances of the same word 
as numerically one and the same word.70
 The difficulty inherent in the Aristotelian theory of place is thus solved by 
appealing to the twofold notion of the instant immobility of place and its incorruptibility 
by equivalence.71 This solution is radically distinct from the Thomist one as it distances 
itself from the Aristotelian teaching on at least two points: (1) the first – clearly pointed 
out by O. Boulnois -– is the rejection of the cosmological reference. By contrast to 
Aquinas, Scotus no longer explains the immobility of each particular place through the 
immobility of the universe, but rather changes the terms of reference by choosing the 
notion of instant: considered instantly, the place is motionless. By the same token, the 
place’s natural properties become strongly relativized: place ‘disengages itself from 
cosmology, and becomes a neutral space, a purely absolute form’.72 (2) The second point 
in which Scotus distances himself from Aristotle – and Aquinas – consists in the (partial) 
dissociation of place (insofar as it is an accident) from its subject. Indeed, that the subject 
– i.e. the containing body - is movable does not entail for Scotus that its accident – the 
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place – is also movable. In other words, the place as accident does not share – at least not 
totally – the conditions of its subject, for the subject’s movement does not make the same 
place move, but rather produces another place. It is this dissociation which enables the 
immobility of place. Place thus appears to be the only accident to function in this way, i.e 
by being attached to a subject without completely sharing in its condition. By virtue of 
this ‘detachment’ the place acquires a certain independence with regard to the subject it 
determines. This detachment confirms the Scotist tendency to conceive place as the 
specific and qualitatively neutral determination of all quantum. 
 To conclude his examination of the place of bodies, Scotus raises a question 
which brings to the fore another point of dissidence with the Aristotelian theory, and 
which will enable the transition to the problem of the place of separate substances. The 
question is ‘whether every body, as quantum, is necessarily in a place’.73 Rather 
surprising at first sight if we take into account the conditions of bodily location 
mentioned above, the question in fact seems to obey to a relativization of the Aristotelian 
theory. Against this theory Scotus levels a criticism strongly indebted to the 
condemnation of 1277 and the theological preoccupations surrounding it.74
 According to Scotus, the necessity of the location of bodies must be denied from 
the point of view of faith since, by virtue of his omnipotence, God could ‘create a stone 
without a containing body, or create it outside the universe’. In both cases, the stone 
would exist without being in a place. Consequently, location is not an absolute necessity 
and is not imposed by something absolute and external to the object – such a thing being, 
according to the Aristotelian theory, the external celestial sphere which encloses the 
world.75 Here again, Scotus weakens the relation between particular places and the 
universal place. A quantum can exist in the world without being located, just as it can be 
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created outside of the world – which would purely and simply suppress all relation to the 
cosmic place. This is possible on the assumption of divine omnipotence, which here 
functions as a force of rupture with Aristotelian science. Thus, although taken into 
account at the beginning of his discussion, the Aristotelian definition of place (as the 
boundary of the container) is considerably relativized by Scotus, as he limits its universal 
import and necessity. Thereafter, location is removed from the net of physical relations 
between bodies and is redefined as an intrinsic condition of all being: ‘Per nihil igitur 
absolutum in alio, requirit necessario esse in loco, sed tantum habet necessario 
potentiam passivam qua posset esse in loco’.76
 
2.2. The location of angels 
The previous considerations provide the context for the Scotist examination of angelic 
location, which basically applies the conditions of bodily location to the domain of 
separate substances. The connection with the realm of spiritual substances is made clear 
from Scotus’s discussion, which declares from the outset – and in contrast to the previous 
Franciscan tradition – that the angel is not necessarily located (in a physical place).77 The 
main reason for Scotus’s thesis is that God could create an angel independently from the 
creation of corporeal realities, or outside the physical world. This thesis excludes – and 
for stronger reasons than in the case of bodies – any necessity derived from 
circumscribing angels within the coordinates of physical space. However, the rejection of 
that necessity does not imply a denial of any relation with the place. Indeed, Scotus 
affirms that relation and grounds it on a ‘passive power which enables the angel to be in a 
place’.78 In this way, he transforms necessity into possibility and interiorizes the latter by 
henceforth detaching it from an immediate reference to a physical container. 
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 What exactly is this passive power? In response, Scotus proposes three possible 
foundations for it: the angel’s substance itself, the limitation inherent in its substance, or 
something extrinsic to the spiritual creature.79 He seems in the end to discard all three 
possibilities, for he sees no sense in seeking an intrinsic reason (i.e. intrinsic to the 
angel’s substance) for the necessary location of spiritual creatures. For according to 
Scotus, there is no such reason.80 By rejecting the idea of an intrinsic and necessary 
foundation, Scotus renders futile the question which much occupied the preceding 
philosophical and theological tradition of a necessary principle of angelic location. For 
Scotus, angelic location is no more than a possibility, and is explained solely by its 
compatibility (or non-contradiction) with angelic reality.81
 It thus follows that, contrary to material realities (which have an intrinsic natural 
capacity to be located)82, the angel is not comprised necessarily and by nature within the 
limits of a containing body existing in act. In this respect, angelic location is equivocal to 
the location of material bodies. 
 As regards the second condition (being ‘in a determinate place because equivalent 
to it’), angels fulfil it, but – again – only equivocally in comparison to bodies. For bodies 
necessarily occupy a place which is equivalent to their material quantity – what an angel 
cannot do, since it is immaterial. Still, an angel cannot be in a place which is infinitely 
large or infinitely small, but occupies a determinate place by its ‘quantitas virtutis’83, that 
is, according to the power or potency that characterizes its being. Consequently, the angel 
effectively occupies a determinate – i.e. limited – place, but ‘in an indeterminate way’.84 
This caveat (‘indeterminate tamen’), at first sight rather vague, could be understood in 
two ways: the indeterminacy primarily indicates that the angel is not located according to 
a material equivalence with the containing place; alternatively, it indicates a margin of 
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indeterminacy between the infinitely large and the infinitely small. Both magnitudes are 
excluded, but within the interval separating them an angel can occupy places in a 
differentiated manner (that is, not fixed or previously determined), since ‘no 
configuration of place is repugnant to it’.85 Thus, the ‘quantitas virtutis’ of the angel 
determines the possibility of its presence in a place, but not in the sense of constituting 
the natural foundation of its presence in such or such a place by equivalence or 
proportionality. For the angel has the freedom to be in a place more or less large, 
provided that the place is neither infinitely large nor infinitely small.86 Therefore, in 
respect to the second condition we find both analogy (the angel is in a sense present in a 
determinate place) and equivocity (it is not the case that the angel is present by 
equivalence) between angelic location and bodily location. 
 On the same grounds, separate substances fail to fulfil the third condition, since 
they are not commensurable to the place in which they are present, insofar as they are not 
composed of parts which could be adequate to the parts of the physical place.87
 The fourth condition, by contrast, is verified in spiritual creatures, since each and 
every one of them occupies a determinate place rather than being everywhere.88 Actual 
location does indeed occur in relation to a determinate place, which nevertheless does not 
imply – as already pointed out – a ‘(necessary) presence by equivalence’. 
 As for the fifth condition, we find again equivocity between the mode of angelic 
location and that of bodies. Angels do not have a natural relation to their place, so that 
they are not found in any place either naturally or violently, just as no containing body 
would be able to preserve them in a place.89 The passive power which founds the 
possibility of angelic location is therefore neither natural nor violent, but neutral – just as 
a surface is indifferent to blackness or whiteness - so the passive potency of angels is 
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indifferent to such or such a place and can thus occupy any place provided that it is 
neither infinitely large or infinitely small. This neutrality or indifference allows the free 
exercise of the will, by virtue of which the angel can decide to move to one or another 
place.90
 What can we conclude from this comparative study on the location of spiritual 
creatures? Mainly two statements: (1) just as in any other creature, in the angel there is a 
passive power which founds its location; (2) the angel is located in a determinate place 
because it cannot be everywhere.91 Thus, among the conditions for the location of bodies, 
only one is fulfilled by angels, namely that they occupy a determinate place. This 
conclusion is central, as it synthesizes the Scotist solution to the initial question. Against 
the thesis of angelic location according to operation, Scotus opts for location ‘per se’ and 
grounds it on the neutral passive power which characterizes the angel’s relation to its 
place. He thus follows the directives of the 1277 condemnation, while refraining from 
identifying the foundation of location.92 Finally, what is important for Scotus is that the 
angel is located, since it is wholly compatible not only with its condition as a creature, 
but also with its finiteness. 
 The significance accorded to created finiteness brings the Scotist position in 
connection to that of his Franciscan predecessors, who understood angelic location as 
hinging on the condition of finiteness of all creatures.93 Scotus’s position remains 
however distinct in its denial of the necessity of the location of angels: from their location 
de facto we cannot infer a necessity de iure. Scotus is here proceeding according to his 
general philosophical approach, as he first seeks the conditions of possibility before 
examining the fact. This allows him to criticize, by appealing to divine omnipotence, any 
claim of necessity when it comes to the physical world. 
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 Scotus’s approach results in the thesis that angelic location is a pure possibility. 
But how is this thesis consonant with the notion that the angel occupies a determinate 
place? What brings about the passage from the mere possibility to the actual fact? Scotus 
is well aware of this difficulty and applies himself to solving it in order to lay solid 
grounds for the thesis of the location ‘per se’ and ‘de facto’ of angels. This difficulty is 
clearly formulated in the Lectura: ‘Sed quaeres: si angelus habet possibilitatem passivam 
essendi in loco, a quo agitur habet quod sit in loco, cum nihil reducat se de potentia ad 
actum?’.94 The passage from de iure to de facto cannot be achieved by the angel itself. In 
actual fact, each angel is already and always present in a place, even though its location 
does not represent more than a mere possibility in the ontological order. The example of 
the surface which is in potentiality to its colour can help to clarify this. For just as the 
surface’s potentiality is reduced to actuality by surface’s efficient cause – even if a wall is 
always and already coloured from the moment of its construction – in the same way the 
agent who creates the angel creates it from the outset as located in a determinate place – 
even if an angel cannot exist without being in a place. In other words, the neutral passive 
power to all possible places is determined and actualized by the same act of creation 
which from the outset locates the angel in some place.95 The angel is thus already and 
always created in the world, as every other creature. De facto there is nothing outside the 
physical space except for God and all that his absolute power can produce. In contrast to 
the thesis of location according to operation – which appears to grant to the angel the 
freedom to ‘enter the world’ and locate itself in a place which does not pertain to it of 
itself – Scotus’s thesis ‘secularizes’ angelic location as it makes of the angel another 
worldly creature by reintroducing it to the world by the very act of its creation. It is 
therefore God who performs the passage from de iure to de facto and it is God alone who 
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can dissolve the angel’s relation to its place by ‘de-secularizing’ the angel and creating it 
outside of the world. 
 Like his Franciscan colleagues, Scotus ‘secularizes’, i.e. humanizes, the angel, 
while at the same time he frees it from the conditions of location proper to corporeal 
bodies as such. On the other hand, Scotus departs from his fellow Franciscans in that for 
him angels are not only not located ‘circumscriptive’ – what was commonly accepted – 
but they can also, and even according to their natural possibilities, occupy many places 
simultaneously, provided that none of these is adequate to the quantum of the angel’s 
power.96 Beyond its realization de facto, this hypothesis is conceivable at a natural level 
because it does not imply contradiction.97 Moreover, it is possible also, and a fortiori, by 
God’s absolute power.98
 Following this line, Scotus considers the question whether different angels can 
occupy the same place, although he is somewhat ambiguous in his response. While 
denying the affirmative thesis, he believes that the opposite arguments raised against it 
are unconvincing.99 At the same time, he appears to admit its plausibility by virtue of 
angelic nature alone and beyond its ever possible realization by virtue of God’s absolute 
power.100 This plausibility rests, among other things, on the analogy between spatial and 
temporal relation. Just as two temporal realities can take place at the same time, in the 
same way two angels can occupy the same space.101 Thus, without categorically 
affirming the presence of different angels in the same place, Scotus does not consider this 
hypothesis as necessarily contradictory. This responds to his emphasis – in contrast to 
Aquinas – on the angel’s freedom in the exercise of his motor faculties,102 and to his 
criticism – against his Franciscan predecessors – of a rigid understanding of the angel’s 
relation to space as a necessary connection.103
 22
 
3. Space: between angelological inquiry and physical theory 
The Scotist conception of the location of separate substances is significant in various 
respects. As way of conclusion, I will highlight some of the chief features of the Scotist 
contribution to angelology and the theory of physical place. 
 Scotus’s account represents an important contribution to the discussion of angelic 
location, most notably in the context of the years following the condemnation of 1277. 
He adopts the doctrinal line enforced by the condemnation – to which he incidentally 
attributes universal import – and defends the location ‘per se’ of angels. In this respect, 
and like his fellow Franciscans, he reintroduces the angel in the physical space and 
locates it in a determinate place. Thus located, the angel can neither be nowhere nor 
everywhere. Although sharing a common horizon with the heirs of 1277, the Scotist 
account follows its own path, a path which – at least to my knowledge – can be 
characterized as original. 
 Its originality lies first of all in Scotus’s particular preoccupation – here as in 
other instances - to identify conditions of possibility before explaining a given fact 
(unverifiable in the case of angels!) to which he does not accord any necessity. Now, 
there is only one condition of possibility for angelic location, namely their ‘neutral 
passive power’ in relation to place. 
 Consequently – and this constitutes the second new element in Scotus’s approach 
– the angel is not located in the physical space by virtue of a natural capacity or an 
intrinsic necessity, but only because God so chose at the moment of creation.104 The 
angel’s location thus results from God’s will, who comprised it as a feature of its created 
being. The relation to a place thus becomes an indication of the dependence and the 
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finiteness which characterize the angel’s created condition. 
 The third new element in the Scotist conception lies in the twin hypotheses of the 
simultaneous occupation of different places by one and the same angel, and the presence 
of different angels in one and the same place. As we saw, Scotus is cautious with regards 
to the second hypothesis, but he clearly affirms the non-contradiction of the first. On this 
point, the Scotist view is innovative both in relation to Aquinas and to his fellow 
Franciscans of the time succeeding the 1277 condemnation. Scotus’s acceptance of the 
hypothesis in question results from the priority he accords to the examination of the 
conditions of possibility. From this perspective, non-contradiction suffices to render a 
hypothesis acceptable before and beyond its actual realization. As for its significance and 
consequences, this hypothesis seems to allow a consideration of the relation to place in 
terms of non-equivalence. Furthermore, it leads Scotus at least on this occasion to 
dissolve the strong affinity between the angel and the human soul, usually underlined by 
the Franciscan tradition.105 Indeed, whereas the human soul has to be present as a whole 
in each and every part of the body and cannot do otherwise, the angel ‘can abandon the 
middle while remaining in the extremities, and by the same token be in two places 
simultaneously’.106 As these features reveal, the Scotist conception of the location of 
separate substances represents a significant contribution to medieval angelology, which 
Scotus steers in a direction of ‘secularization’ and humanization of the angel, while at the 
same time drawing from the angel’s sui generis status in the formulation of hypotheses 
novel to human experience. 
 Furthermore, the theory of place developed in an angelological context also 
contributes to the theory of physical place. Since the import and the novelty of the Scotist 
conception of place has already been exhaustively elucidated,107 I will limit my task to 
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highlighting three points concerning angelic location which complete or confirm the 
Scotist theory of physical place. 
 (1) The first concerns the necessity of location. As has been made clear, bodies, 
by their nature as bodies, are necessarily present in a place, their removal from all place 
being only possible by virtue of God’s absolute power.108 By contrast, angels are not 
necessarily present in a place, not even from the point of view of their nature – although 
de facto they have always and from the outset been created in a place. This angelic 
prerogative allows to conceive location as the determination of a condition (that of 
creatures) and not of a nature. From this perspective, ‘“per se” location’ means ‘location 
by the being of a nature already in existence’. Moreover, to the extent that there is a 
(transcendental) priority of the ‘pure nature’ with respect to its existence, the nature will 
not be necessarily affected by local determination. The latter has an impact only, and 
inevitably, on created actual existence. 
 (2) The second point has to do with the naturalness of the relation to a place. 
Whereas bodies, in their nature as bodies, relate to a place as something natural to them, 
the angel relates to a place in a neutral way in that all places pertain to it equally. This 
detachment with respect to a natural place contributes to break with the Aristotelian 
theory of place. The case of angelic location thus allows to consider the relation to a 
place no longer in terms of natural suitability, but in terms of an existential condition. 
Therefore, as determining factor of all created existence, place does not have to be 
necessarily conceived as a relation of suitability or pertinence. On the same grounds, and 
in a broader perspective, the cosmological reference – essential for the Aristotelian theory 
– is radically put in question. 
 (3) The third point of rupture lies in the thesis that angels are located in a 
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determinate place ‘in an indeterminate manner’. This prerogative grants a ‘manoeuvring 
margin’ to spiritual substances with regard to the quantity of the occupied place. In other 
words, the angel’s location is not restricted to a quantitative equivalence (not even 
virtual) with the place it occupies. This factor, like the previous one, questions the 
adequacy between the located reality and the containing place, and by the same token 
levels a criticism against the notion of contiguity characteristic of the Aristotelian theory. 
 Therefore, the theory of angelic location not only confirms but also emphasizes 
the rupture between the Scotist conception of place and the Aristotelian doctrine. The 
three points highlighted underpin the idea of space as independent from cosmic 
coordinates (centre and poles of the universe) - the idea of place as a pure system of 
reference. The dissolution of the natural link prepares the ground for the homogenization 
of space, just as the given fact of the location of angels operates in favour of the 
homogenization of created reality. 
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